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INTRODUCTION 
The series of uprisings against long-standing autocratic regimes 
taking place across the Arab region since December 2010 are often 
collectively referred to as the Arab Spring. This phenomenon raises 
interesting questions for scholars affiliated with the Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement. In many ways, 
the youth in the Arab world have a sense of being part of their own 
independence struggle, recalling the independence movements of 
postcolonial states. Where will the Arab Spring look for inspiration in 
rethinking the nature of governance and the state so as to fruitfully 
rebuild their societies? How will they envision participating in the 
international system, given the complicity of international law and 
international institutions in causing many of their troubles, and the 
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To shed light on these concerns, this Article takes a Third World 
approach to understanding the Arab Spring. TWAIL readings of the 
Arab Spring could potentially focus on a variety of issues, such as the 
region’s geostrategic importance for world powers, continual Western 
military and economic intervention into the region, the prevalence of 
longstanding autocratic regimes, the region’s symbolic importance for 
many world religions, and so on. Instead, this Article places the Arab 
Spring in the context of a long history of struggle to control natural 
resources. A significant part of this struggle has taken place in the 
legal arena, with enduring consequences both for international law 
and the Third World. Such contextualization will help bring attention 
to the neglected, but crucial, environmental aspects of the Arab 
Spring. It also allows an opportunity for self-reflection on how 
TWAIL has engaged with environmental issues—issues that are the 
subject of increasing attention in the Third World today. This Article 
argues that the natural environment plays a seminal role in 
constructing the sovereign state, and the ability to control nature is an 
assumed attribute of both sovereignty and development. When 
examined in the context of Arab state formation, it is possible to link 
longstanding assumptions about the relationship between the state and 
nature with the contemporary demands of the Arab Spring. Such 
assumptions need to be re-thought in order to meaningfully address 
these demands. 
Part One introduces the TWAIL movement and describes what it 
means to take a Third World approach. Part Two considers TWAIL 
scholarship on the environment, which in its early years focused on 
natural resources, then went through a period of disengagement, with 
a current resurgence of interest. Part Three analyzes the implications 
of international law and TWAIL understandings of natural resources 
for the Arab Spring. Based on this analysis, the Conclusion considers 
useful legal responses to the Arab Spring and contemplates the 
TWAIL movement’s future engagement with environmental issues. 
I 
WHAT IS TWAIL? 
The acronym TWAIL first emerged from the New Approaches to 
International Law (NAIL) movement in the mid 1990s. NAIL was the 
intellectual project of an association of academics in the United States 
interested in investigating the international law discipline as a “legal 
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intelligentsia with its own cultural politics and will to power.”1 The 
term TWAIL was initially coined by a group of NAIL scholars 
committed to furthering Third World interests. However, the acronym 
soon expanded to encompass the significant amount of such 
scholarship that already existed before the 1990s, which served as a 
foundation and inspiration for the 1990s movement. Since then, the 
movement has grown to include scholars that have self-identified with 
TWAIL and share its political commitment to addressing Third World 
issues and prioritizing Third World interests. 
The term “Third World2” has been used interchangeably with the 
terms “less-developed,” “developing,” “underdeveloped,” or the 
“global South,” to refer to states and peoples that are marginalized in 
international society—lagging behind in terms of economic growth 
and prosperity as well as political power and influence.3 Third World 
states have sometimes formed political coalitions, such as the Group 
of 77 (G-77) and the Non-Aligned Movement,4 and Third World 
peoples have also been loosely linked at various times by social 
movements of protest by the poor against the rich.5 Mwalimu Julius 
Nyerère described the Third World as the majority of the world’s 
population, possessing the largest part of certain important raw 
materials, and yet having no control and hardly any influence over the 
manner in which nations of the world arrange their economic affairs.6 
In the late twentieth century, when many Third World states such 
as South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Hong Kong, and Singapore 
 
1 David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 335, 489 (2000). 
2 The term “Third World” is credited to the French demographer Albert Sauvy, who 
drew an analogy with the Tiers État within French society in order to address the 
marginalized and oppressed among the population. ALFRED SAUVY, LA TERRE ET LES 
HOMMES: LE MONDE OÙ IL VA, LE MONDE D’OÙ IL VIENT 41 (1990). 
3 Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal 
Discourse, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353, 356 (1998). 
4 The Group of 77 or G-77 was formed on June 15, 1964, through the Joint Declaration 
of the 77 Countries issued at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). See About the Group of 77, THE GROUP 77 AT THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.g77.org/doc/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). The Non-Aligned Movement was 
founded in Belgrade in 1961 to advocate a middle course for states of the developing 
world between the Western and Eastern blocs during the Cold War. It is a group of states 
that considered themselves not aligned formally with or against any major power bloc. See 
FIFTEENTH SUMMIT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT and INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE 
FOR NON-ALIGNED STUDIES, http://www.iins.org/ (last visited Sept 30, 2012). 
5 Mickelson, supra note 3, at 357. 
6 J. Nyerère, South-South Opinion, in THE THIRD WORLD STRATEGY: ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL COHESION IN THE SOUTH 9–10 (Altaf Gauhar ed., 1983). 
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successfully developed an export-oriented process of 
industrialization, analysts began to declare that the Third World no 
longer existed.7 Rapid economic growth in China and India raises the 
same issue today. The term “Third World” is also criticized because 
of the growing diversity amongst Third World states and the 
fracturing and reshaping of alliances between them. Scholars have 
long argued that the concept of the Third World camouflages the 
differences between and within these nations. Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri famously declared that globalization had made the 
Third World obsolete, as there is a First World in every Third World, 
and a Third in the First, and the Second almost nowhere at all.8 
TWAIL scholars have negotiated these issues continually from the 
very early years of the movement. R.P. Anand observed of the Third 
World that: 
[t]hey cover a whole range of economic, political and cultural 
diversities, even antagonisms. The family of underdeveloped 
countries include both producers and consumers of energy, 
importers and exporters of raw materials, nations which can feed 
their populations as well as those which almost always face the 
spectre of famine. They differ among themselves so greatly in 
economic promise that they are sometimes divided into ‘third’, 
‘fourth’ and ‘fifth’ worlds . . . In fact, for many purposes it is more 
misleading than illuminating to lump together countries of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. And yet, for a variety of purposes these 
countries perceive themselves as a group, a perception made more 
impressive because it overcomes an underlying, undeniable 
diversity.9 
Many decades after Anand helped pioneer TWAIL scholarship, his 
observations on the self-identified and self-constituted nature of 
TWAIL remain insightful. The movement continues to grow because 
of its enduring relevance for scholars from across geographical, 
social, and cultural divides. International lawyers from Africa, North 
and South America, Asia and the Pacific, and Europe are still drawn 
together by shared concerns for the poorest and most vulnerable 
peoples in their societies, finding common patterns of domination and 
subordination and usefulness in working together. 
 
7 See, e.g., NIGEL HARRIS, THE END OF THE THIRD WORLD (1987); Mark T. Berger, 
The End of the “Third World”?, 15 THIRD WORLD Q. 257 (1994); Mark T. Berger, After 
the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 9 
(2004). 
8 MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 263–64 (2000). 
9 R.P. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION? 120 (1987). 
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The endurance of TWAIL is partly attributable to the way the term 
“Third World” has been employed by TWAIL scholars, with an 
awareness of its flexible, porous meanings. Indeed, TWAIL 
scholarship has helped highlight that there are no rigid boundaries 
between the colonized and the colonizers, or between the Third World 
and the West. The identities of victor and victim were rarely pure in 
colonial times, and the postcolonial world has seen a continuation of 
mutual cultural transference and hybridity of cultures and identities.10 
Rather than claiming that inflexible boundaries exist between the 
West and the Third World, much of TWAIL scholarship endeavors to 
break down these boundaries and contest any claims to the stability of 
meaning and identity.11 Most TWAIL scholars have understood 
colonialism as a cultural project of control. Colonized societies were 
classified and labeled. New distinctions and oppositions came into 
being between colonizers and colonized, Europe and Asia, modern 
and primitive, and West and East.12 One of the purposes of TWAIL is 
to complicate contemporary understandings of the Third World, 
rejecting simplistic characterizations of Third World states and 
peoples. As Baxi has observed, long before Hardt and Negri identified 
globalization as scrambling the composition of the Three Worlds, 
scrambling had already occurred by means of centuries of 
colonialism.13 
Within the TWAIL movement, “Third World” has evolved to mean 
more than just the traditional coalition of states, encompassing Third 
World peoples, social movements, non-government organizations, 
and non-state and transnational actors.14 As Philip Darby has pointed 
out, while the term “Third World” may be problematic, the 
alternatives are too, and it is hard to do without the category as it 
 
10 LEELA GANDHI, POSTCOLONIAL THEORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 126, 131, 
137 (1998). 
11 See, e.g., Annelise Riles, Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and 
the Essentialisation of Culture, 106 HARV. L. REV. 723 (1993); Dianne Otto, Subalternity 
and International Law: The Problems of Global Community and the Incommensurability 
of Difference, 5 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 337 (1996). 
12 NICHOLAS B. DIRKS, CASTES OF MIND: COLONIALISM AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN INDIA 9 (2001). 
13 HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8; Upendra Baxi, What May the “Third World” Expect  
from International Law?, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 713, 717 (2006) (giving the examples of 
enforced diasporas of laboring classes, slavery, slave-like labor, forced relocations, and so 
on). 
14 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human 
Rights and Development as a Third World Strategy, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 767, 767 (2006). 
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provides the “conceptual tripwire against colonising tendencies of 
much dominant discourse.”15 It is a concept and terminology that aids 
counter-hegemonic discourse. 
II 
TWAIL AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Environmental issues have not been a focus of TWAIL scholarship 
since the acronym was first espoused in the mid 1990s. This was not 
always the case amongst international lawyers advocating for Third 
World issues, and it is unlikely to remain the case in the future. In the 
1960s and 1970s, Third World international lawyers prioritized 
environmental issues, such as control over natural resources and the 
fair sharing of resources outside sovereign territories. Environmental 
principles, including the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources and the common heritage of humankind, were at the 
heart of post-independence Third World law reform movements.16 
Early TWAIL scholarship in the post-independence era proceeded 
on the basis that newly-independent states would embrace only those 
parts of international law that were consistent with their sovereignty.17 
This assumption was based on the norms of sovereign equality and 
non-intervention.18 Newly-independent Third World states were 
hopeful that the formation of the United Nations, and the liberal 
precepts of equality, freedom, and neutrality that it embodied, would 
help them participate in international law. TWAIL scholars in the 
decolonization era wanted to emphasise that the Third World was 
engaged with international law; that it had contributed, and was 
capable of continuing to contribute, to a system of global order.19 
 
15 Phillip Darby, Pursuing the Political: A Postcolonial Rethinking of Relations 
International, 33 MILLENNIUM: J. INT’L STUD. 1, 2–3 (2004). 
16 See infra note 38. 
17 See Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law 
and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77 (2003) 
(Anghie and Chimni include in this early group Georges Abi-Saab, F. Garcia-Amador, 
R.P. Anand, Mohammed Bedjaoui, Taslim O Elias, C.H. Alexandrowicz, Richard Falk, 
Nico Schrijver, and P.J.I.M. de Waart). 
18 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1; art. 2, para. 7. 
19 See, e.g., C.H. ALEXANDROWICZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW 
OF NATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES (16TH, 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES) (1967); ASIAN 
STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (R.P. ANAND ed., 
1972); C.G. WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE (1988); SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996); Onuma Yasuaki, When was the Law of International 
Society Born? An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational 
Perspective, 2 J. HIST. INT’L L. 1 (2000). 
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These scholars hoped Third World legal traditions could be gradually 
integrated into the existing system through participation in the 
evolution of the traditional sources of law.20 
Despite the endeavours of TWAIL scholars over the last sixty 
years for Third World participation in the international legal system, 
international courts and tribunals have not significantly drawn on 
non-Western legal traditions in the administration of international 
justice.21 However, Third World states have participated in the law-
making process in some important ways. Perhaps the most notable of 
these has been the establishment of the right to self-determination.22 
Third World states also contributed to outlawing apartheid and racism 
in modern international law, turning away from the law’s colonial 
past. Other legal concepts that Third World states played a significant 
part in formulating include the principle of common heritage of 
humankind; the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources; the concept of peaceful and friendly relations among states; 
social, economic, and cultural rights; the right to development for all 
states and peoples; the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities for the global environment; and the concept of 
sustainable development.23 
Third World international lawyers’ focus on environmental and 
natural resource issues occurred in the context of their movement to 
inaugurate a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1960s 
and 1970s to improve Third World participation in the global 
economy.24 In 1945, when the Charter of the United Nations was 
drafted in San Francisco, the Charter clearly located responsibility for 
economic matters within the U.N. in order to regulate the increased 
number of nation-states in the newly decolonized world.25 
Nevertheless, Western powers were committed to a separate system, 
formulated at Bretton Woods, to regulate economic matters. Third 
World international lawyers argued this was contrary to explicit 
 
20 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para. 1. 
21 Christopher Weeramantry & Nathaniel Berman, The Grotius Lecture Series, 14 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 1515, 1562–68 (1999). 
22 Baxi, supra note 13, at 719. 
23 Id. 
24 See G.A. Res. 1803 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962); G.A. Res. 3281 
(XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974); G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974); MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979). 
25 U.N. Charter, supra note 18, at art. 1, para. 3; art. 55; art. 56. 
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Charter provisions, alleging the West was pursuing a conscious policy 
to keep economic matters out of the U.N. General Assembly where 
Third World states could participate as equals.26 
Third World states, in a political coalition called the G-77, 
attempted to reform the economic system by passing resolutions in 
the U.N. General Assembly where they had superior numbers.27 
These resolutions asserted Third World states’ control over their 
natural wealth, propounding a doctrine of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources. Mohammed Bedjaoui provided much of the legal 
basis for the NIEO in his seminal work, Towards a New International 
Economic Order, criticizing the imperial nature of international law.28 
However, at the same time, the NIEO called for economic 
cooperation to be removed “from the field of good faith and . . . 
[moved] to the legal sphere.”29 While rejecting the system, Bedjaoui 
simultaneously called for economic matters to be regulated by 
international law. Despite critiquing dominant operations of law, 
Bedjaoui nonetheless retained faith in the international legal system’s 
determinacy and potential for fairness and justice. 
The attempt to reform the international economic system and 
international law ultimately failed. While experts disagreed on 
reasons for failure, the G-77’s unity around NIEO was ultimately 
offset by coordinated economic policy responses in wealthy states and 
the move towards the Washington Consensus.30 Thus, in some sense, 
the NIEO did indeed provoke a new order, albeit not the one intended. 
Some scholars also attributed the failure of NIEO to internal 
inconsistencies, where the G-77 took up a seemingly oppositional 
stance, but at the same time uncritically embraced the underlying 
precepts of the existing system.31 All the same, it was the G-77’s 
reliance on accepted legal argument and discourse that gave this 
challenge a voice in the international arena and made it possible to 
argue, albeit unsuccessfully, for so radical a proposal. 
 
26 Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Redressing Global Injustices: The Role of Law, in 
THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 365 
(Frederick E. Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai eds., 1987). 
27 The success of this strategy was limited since U.N. General Assembly resolutions 
were relegated to the category of “soft law” by Western states because they did not satisfy 
positivist legal requirements. See Anghie, infra note 30. 
28 BEDJAOUI, supra note 24, at 41, 50. 
29 Emilio O. Rabasa, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 68 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. 302, 302 (1974) (quoting Mexican President Luis Echeverría). 
30 See generally Otto, supra note 11; ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY 
AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 196–235 (2004). 
31 Otto, supra note 11, at 348, 353. 
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Early TWAIL scholars embraced the transformative potential of 
the law. Yet reforms such as the NIEO were not adopted despite their 
basis on the values of equality and the rule of law which international 
law claims to promote.32 Failed reform attempts by earlier scholars 
inspired the search for a stronger mode of critique by those TWAIL 
scholars emerging out of the NAIL movement in the 1990s. This 
scholarship attempted to understand why so many apparently liberal 
and neutral international law projects did not deliver on their 
promise.33 Some scholars pointed to the futility of attempting reform 
within the existing international law framework, claiming that lack of 
success in the past was evidence that the system itself is complicit in 
the subjugation of formerly colonized peoples.34 They argued that 
concepts that seem ostensibly open and neutral actually help to further 
inequalities in contemporary international relations, albeit in an 
unstated way.35 Therefore, these scholars attempted to identify how 
bias is embedded into the discipline, perpetuating ongoing structural 
violence towards the Third World. 
More recent TWAIL scholarship also proclaimed a shift in focus to 
the actualized experience of Third World peoples rather than Third 
World states. Early TWAIL scholarship frequently relied on 
principles of non-intervention and sovereignty in its attempts to 
empower Third World states. However, this tactic became 
increasingly unpopular with Third World peoples and scholarship, not 
only because of its lack of success in instituting more equal 
relationships between states, but also because such legal arguments 
were co-opted and manipulated by powerful elites in the Third World 
who used anti-Western sentiment to “cover up contemporary faults, 
corruptions, tyrannies.”36 Some Third World governments, including 
 
32 Makau Mutua & Antony Anghie, What is TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
31, 40 (2000). 
33 Id. at 39. 
34 Otto, supra note 11, at 344–48. 
35 See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International 
Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 1996 (2000); Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism 
in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1999); SIBA N. 
GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS: RACE AND SELF-
DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996); B.S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES (1993); Riles, supra 
note 11. 
36 EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 17 (1993). See also Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, Modernity and Ethnicity in India, in MULTICULTURAL STATES: RETHINKING 
DIFFERENCE AND IDENTITY 91 (David Bennett ed., 1996) (describing the fears of some 
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many Arab regimes, used principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention as shields from international scrutiny while they 
perpetuated injustices on their own peoples and unjustly enriched 
domestic and international elites. Therefore, more recent TWAIL 
scholarship has maintained that “it is sometimes through supporting 
the Third World state and at others, by critiquing it, that the interests 
of Third World peoples may be advanced.”37 
While TWAIL pioneers focused on natural resource sovereignty 
and fair sharing of resources from common areas such as the deep 
seabed,38 the more critical strain of TWAIL scholarship that emerged 
in the 1990s did not deeply engage with environmental or natural 
resource issues.39 Lack of TWAIL scholarship on environmental 
matters in recent decades may be attributable to an intellectual 
ambivalence about the embryonic field of international environmental 
law and its usefulness for Third World interests. Third World states, 
peoples, and scholars have long been wary of the international 
environmental law project, perceiving it as an attempt to ameliorate 
Western development mistakes at the expense of Third World 
development.40 As Anand observes; 
[T]here are sharp and bitter differences between the developed and 
the under-developed, the rich and the poor, the satiated and the 
hungry . . . . As the ways of life and consumer habits of the rich 
countries, and prosperity of their people are transmitted to the 
remotest corners of the Third World . . . ambitions to imitate them 
naturally arise . . . . The poor countries have also come to realize 
that the only way to alleviate themselves from the long and 
humiliating servitude is to achieve an industrial base . . . like those 
in North America and Europe, irrespective of the environmental 
 
Indian intellectuals that postcolonial and subaltern critique will play into the hands of 
Hindu fundamentalists by promoting a new indigenism in the populace). See also Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, HABITATIONS OF MODERNITY: ESSAYS IN THE WAKE OF SUBALTERN 
STUDIES xxi (2002). 
37 Anghie & Chimni, supra note 17, at 83. 
38 See, e.g., R.P. ANAND, LEGAL REGIME OF THE SEA-BED AND THE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (1975); K. Krishna Rao, The Legal Regime of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, 9 
INDIAN J. INT’L L. 1 (1969); A.O. Adede, The Group of 77 and the Establishment of the 
International Sea-Bed Authority, 7 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 31 (1979); PERMANENT 
SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND 
PRACTICE (Kamal Hossain & Subrata Roy Chowdhury eds., 1984); NICO SCHRIJVER, 
SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES (1997). 
39 Karin Mickelson is a notable exception. See, e.g., Karin Mickelson, South, North, 
International Environmental Law, and International Environmental Lawyers, 11 Y.B. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. 52 (2000). 
40 Anil Agarwal & Sunita Narain, Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of 
Environmental Colonialism, EARTH ISLAND J. 39 (1991). 
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effects . . . . The ecologists are horrified to imagine the risk on the 
human horizon if more than two thirds of the “wretched of the 
earth” were also to try and live like Europeans or Japanese or 
sought American standards. Between the chains of poverty in the 
Third World, and the shackles of affluence in the developed 
countries, future seems a prison to many intellectuals.41 
The birth and evolution of international environmental law is 
conventionally narrated as progressing from the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference through the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and the 2002 
Johannesburg Conference to more recent summits in Copenhagen and 
Durban.42 The same decades have witnessed a deepening divide 
between the Third World and the West on environmental issues. 
Legal concepts such as sustainable development and common but 
differentiated responsibilities for the global environment adeptly 
articulated what was needed to bridge the divide. However, the 
concepts were unsuccessful in actually bridging it, as they fell short of 
assigning a hierarchy of norms and actions for states to observe.43 
Despite international environmental law’s unpropitious aspects and 
the continuing conundrum of the intellectual prison Anand identified, 
contemporary TWAIL scholarship is reengaging with environmental 
issues in a trend that is likely to increase sharply in coming years. 
Dominant development patterns coupled with population growth will 
lead to increased resource consumption and pollution and waste, 
causing both resource scarcity and ecological crises. As the last 
remaining pockets of many natural resources exist in the Third World, 
and as poorer regions are more vulnerable to ecological crises, 
international environmental law will become an ever more strategic 
site from which Third World peoples, movements, scholars, and states 
can contest, negotiate, and resist international economic and 
development paradigms. Today, Third World social movements are 
increasingly harnessing environmental issues as an opportune means 
 
41 R.P. Anand, Valedictory Address, in LAW, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT 266–7 (R.P. 
Anand, Rahmatullah Khan & S. Bhatt eds., 1987). 
42 For a critique of this narrative, see Mickelson, supra note 39, at 55–60. She points 
out that most international environmental law texts equate the specialized field with the 
rise of a “global environmental consciousness,” distancing itself from the history of 
international laws that enabled colonialism and the exploitation of Third World natural 
resources. 
43 See, e.g., GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN ORIGINS 
TO GLOBAL FAITH (Patrick Camiller trans., 2d ed., 2002); Jaye Ellis, Sustainable 
Development as a Legal Principle: A Rhetorical Analysis, in 2 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 642 (Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Rüdiger 
Wolfrum & Jana Gogolin eds., 2010). 
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of challenging fundamental assumptions that underpin capitalism and 
development. The same shift is evident amongst TWAIL scholars, 
with environmental issues garnering a significant increase in attention 
in recent TWAIL forums.44 
The increasing engagement of TWAIL scholars with 
environmental issues occurs at an opportune time when alternative 
voices and modes of discourse may help counteract propensities 
towards unprofitable debate and intractable argument in international 
environmental law. In the wake of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate 
Change Summit’s frustrating negotiation deadlock and renowned 
failure to reach international agreement, mass media and scholarly 
discourse have contributed to entrenching a number of misleading 
dogmas about the Third World and international environmental law.45 
The reluctance of “emerging polluters,” such as China and India, to 
commit to strict carbon dioxide emission controls at Copenhagen was 
framed by the United States, and most media commentators, as the 
primary barrier to long-term polluters, such as the United States, 
joining an international regime.46 Since then, experts have 
increasingly argued that, while they are sympathetic to equity and 
justice demands of China, India, and Third World states, urgency 
demands that international agreements be reached soon—even if they 
are unfair agreements—so as to mitigate against potentially 
irreversible environmental damage with regard to changing climates 
and biodiversity loss.47 While such experts do not overstate the 
 
44 For example, while the 2007 TWAIL Conference, held at Albany Law School from 
April 20–21, saw very few papers addressing environmental issues, the 2011 TWAIL 
Conference, held at the University of Oregon School of Law from October 20–22, saw 
environmental papers presented across various general and specialized panels and themes, 
addressing, among other things, the politics of environmental coalitions, capitalism 
working for environmental protection, international law’s role in natural resource 
allocation, and climate investment and adaptation funds, to name but a few. 
45 See, e.g., Lavanya Rajamani, The Making and Unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord, 
59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 824 (2010); David Hunter, Implications of the Copenhagen 
Accord for Global Climate Governance, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4 (2010). 
46 See, e.g., Obama’s Copenhagen Speech, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 18, 2009), available 
at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/18/obamas_copenhagen_speech_0; John 
Vidal et. al., Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure, GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 18, 2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18 
/copenhagen-deal; Richard Black, Why Did Copenhagen Fail to Deliver a Climate Deal?, 
BBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8426835.stm. 
47 See generally ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 
(2010); Alexander Gillespie, An Introduction to Ethical Considerations in International 
Environmental Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 117 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M. Ong & Panos Merkouris eds., 2011); Eric A. 
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urgency of the issue, they contribute to shaping conversations in ways 
that selectively represent the international community’s choices and 
direct attention away from other important conversations. The reason 
wealthy states have not made significant progress in stabilizing 
emissions has little to do with emerging economies and much more to 
do with their own development choices and dilemmas. The exigencies 
of the situation require such issues be urgently addressed and 
overcome because wealthy states remain the largest per capita 
polluters.48 Without such progress and legal commitments on the part 
of wealthy economies, the international environmental law 
commitments of emerging economies will be of little avail in 
mitigating irreversible ecological damage. 
Increasing TWAIL engagement may also help counteract the 
dominant international environmental law narrative of the Third 
World as seeking only poverty alleviation and uninterested in 
environmental protection. Albeit simplistic, this is the picture 
depicted in most disciplinary texts.49 Indeed, as Mario Prost and 
Alejandra Torres Camprubí point out, in recent years it has not been 
unusual to find references to the global South “not merely as a 
reluctant and hesitant participant in multilateral negotiations, but one 
that is perverting environmental diplomacy.”50 The narrative 
obfuscates the lack of environmental consciousness in wealthy 
societies and ignores the progress that many Third World 
communities have made on sustainability issues, increasingly 
necessitated by being on the front lines of climate change, 
deforestation, desertification, drought, and other environmental crises. 
As international environmental law inherited international law’s 
focus on the state as the primary actor on the global stage, its 
discourse does not easily allow appreciation of the potential that local 
sustainable practices have for tackling global problems. TWAIL 
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Repaying Ecological Debt, or Making Environmental Space: Three Stories about 
International Environmental Cooperation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 137 (2005). 
49 DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 27 (2002); ELLI LOUKA, INTERNATIONAL 
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scholars such as Rajagopal have made valuable contributions in this 
regard by examining how international law affects, and is affected by, 
the Third World, not only on the state and interstate level, but with 
regard to grassroots peoples’ movements and social movements that 
at times transcend state boundaries.51 Alongside the reemergence of 
the economic and political power of China, India, Brazil, Russia, 
Indonesia, South Africa, and others—states that have an increasing 
role in shaping the global environment—there is also increased 
potential for alternative cultures, understandings, and voices to 
emerge to help creatively articulate what sustainable development is, 
and provide choices other than harmful development trajectories of 
the past.52 
The Arab Spring challenges TWAIL scholars to reacquaint 
themselves with and reassess the history of Third World international 
lawyers’ engagement with natural resource and sustainability issues. 
The legacy of early postcolonial efforts to assert sovereignty and 
independence have, to some extent, contributed to the problems 
facing Arab peoples today. The exercise of sovereignty over Arab 
natural resources remains contentious and unresolved and has to be 
rethought so as to meaningfully respond to the demands of the Arab 
Spring. Sustainable solutions also require addressing the impact of 
rapid population growth and climate change in the Arab world, in a 
region that hosts the world’s largest known source of hydrocarbons. 
Part III argues that addressing these complex issues necessitates an 
examination and rethinking of the problematic assumptions about the 
natural environment that underlie international law. 
III 
THE ARAB SPRING 
The United Nations Development Programme’s 2010 Human 
Development Report recorded that Arab states led the world in terms 
of improvements in human development over the past forty years.53 
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Development in leading states such as Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, 
Algeria, Morocco, and Libya was not solely in terms of increased 
gross domestic product, but primarily in terms of improving access to 
health and education.54 Despite such achievements, the region has 
witnessed a wave of popular uprisings challenging state systems. The 
natural environment plays a seminal role in shaping systems of 
governance and law. Understanding this link not only illuminates why 
development gains have been unable to assuage popular 
dissatisfaction, but also how the development process can itself breed 
widespread discontent. 
Political analysts have sought for common threads across the 
numerous uprisings in the Arab region, to formulate effective 
responses to the dissatisfaction expressed en masse in streets and 
squares from north Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, 
and Western Sahara) to the Levant (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, and Syria) to the Arabian peninsula (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen), as well as Iraq and parts 
of Iran. As all these movements challenge state legitimacy, many 
scholars and commentators have pointed to the region’s lack of civil 
and political rights, giving the populace neither protection from the 
state nor means of holding the state accountable. While this is 
undeniably the case across many parts of the Arab world, why is it so 
and how did it come about? What is the role of international law in 
this story? Part of the answer lies in the role of the natural 
environment in shaping governance. Nature has played an important 
role in shaping the modern sovereign state, and the relationship 
between the state of nature and the nature of the state has been 
particularly telling in the Arab world. 
From the region’s vast oil and gas fields, to its increasingly scarce 
water and arable land, the natural environment has profoundly shaped 
political and development trajectories. Indeed, the genesis of many 
Arab states stems from colonial powers drawing state boundaries on 
the basis of known oil reserves.55 The Western idea of the modern 
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state brought to the region not only boundaries, but also the assertion 
of state control over nature as the basis for modernity and progress. 
As E.B. Tylor, a Victorian anthropologist, observed in his 1847 work, 
Primitive Culture, “[a]cquaintance with the physical laws of the 
world, and the accompanying power of adapting nature to man’s own 
ends are, on the whole, lowest among savages, mean among 
barbarians, and highest among modern educated nations.”56 
Scholars and philosophers of the European Enlightenment often 
understood Third World societies as being trapped in a state of nature, 
in contrast with the European state of modernity. The consequence 
was not simply a negative portrayal of non-European cultures, but 
rather an understanding that was to seminally shape imperial projects 
of transformation. During the European Enlightenment, the conquest 
of nature and the growth of industry became accepted as the destiny 
of all societies because it was seen as the best way to meet the 
greatest variety of human needs.57 Thus, Jean-Baptiste Say observed 
in 1828, “[e]ither they will become civilized or they will be 
destroyed. Nothing can hold out against civilization and the powers of 
industry. The only species to survive will be those that industry 
multiplies.”58 Non-European societies were placed within an 
evolutionary spectrum and made to undertake the linear march from 
the state of nature to the modern nation state—the origins of the 
modern concept of development. 
The modern and sovereign nation-state was the conceptual and 
legal vehicle through which the West could reshape Third World 
societies and ostensibly help them escape their primitive natural state. 
The nation-state was tied to a particular understanding of 
development, and postcolonial states were imbued with a civilizing 
mission where developmental progress was equated with the degree 
of state control over nature. Human development was assumed to 
progress from nomadic to pastoral ways of life, followed by the 
advent of agricultural systems, and finally industrial and post-
industrial production modes as societies perfected over time their 
ability to efficiently exploit natural resources.59 
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Consequently, the legal system of the modern nation-state was 
based on the environment being a domain of utility, to be mastered 
and brought under humanity’s control, compelled to satisfy its needs 
and administer to its happiness. Nature was devoid of a spirit, and was 
a standing reserve of resources for humanity to serve its development. 
Law, particularly property and land law, was a central mechanism 
through which the non-European world could be civilized, as it was 
an essential element for allowing industry to thrive. Postcolonial legal 
systems had to evolve to enable the increasingly efficient exploitation 
of nature through appropriate systems of land tenure, private property, 
contracts, torts, and so on. In the nineteenth century, the concept of 
land as private property became embedded in constitutions across 
Europe as a sacred and fundamental element of society.60 As legal 
systems were supposed to enable civilized societies to triumph over 
external nature, they also guaranteed the right of the state to 
expropriate land and resources for the public good—a right now 
recognized as part of customary international law and articulated in 
many postcolonial constitutions. International law and its central 
concept of state sovereignty was a celebration of mastery over nature 
and the escape from primitivism. Whether through international laws, 
such as the terra nullius doctrine and the laws of title to territory,61 or 
domestic laws such as the principle of eminent domain,62 the modern 
nation-state remains founded on the ability to assert not only physical 
but also utilitarian authority over territory. 
Alternative understandings of nature were depicted as either 
primitive or degenerate. Only through the discrediting of non-
European cultures could Enlightenment philosophers propound their 
own insights as objective, rational, and universal truths, and the 
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61 The doctrine of terra nullius derives from Roman Law and is used in international 
law to describe territory that has never been under the control of a sovereign. It is used by 
sovereigns to establish title over new lands by claiming that the land is either empty or 
occupied by societies perceived to be too legally primitive to establish prior effective 
sovereignty of their own. Other international laws on title to territory include the laws of 
conquest, occupation, settlement, cessation, and the doctrine of uti possedites juris, 
declaring the inalterability of colonial frontiers. See also MALCOM N. SHAW, TITLE TO 
TERRITORY (2005); JOSHUA CASTELLINO, STEVE ALLEN & JEREMIE GILBERT, TITLE TO 
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS (2003). 
62 The concept of eminent domain was famously described by Hugo Grotius in De Jure 
Belli et Pacis (1625). It refers to the power of the sovereign to appropriate its subjects’ real 
and personal property. The sovereign may appropriate on the basis that the absolute title of 
the sovereign is superior to the title held by its subjects. 
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civilizing mission as a noble pursuit. Fitzpatrick describes how 
modern law obfuscates its own mythological foundations through 
defining itself as scientific in opposition to the mythic realm of 
primitive law: 
Modernity . . . is not supposed to be about myth . . . . The very idea 
of myth typifies ‘them’—the savages and ancestors ‘we’ have left 
behind . . . . In the infinite arrogance of modernity, myth is made to 
correspond with the static and closed in meaning . . . whilst 
modernity is equated with progress and a fecund openness. Yet the 
origins and identity of modern society are still described in 
seemingly mythic terms, in terms of the division between us and 
them, culture and nature, and so on.63 
Thus modern law emerges and thrives “in a negative exaltation, as 
universal in opposition to the particular, as unified in opposition to the 
diverse, as omnicompetent in contrast to the incompetent, and as 
controlling of what has to be controlled.”64 
During the Enlightenment, control over one’s external environment 
also became equated with inner freedom and the ability to be in the 
fullest sense a liberated human being. Henry Thomas Buckle observes 
in his History of Civilization in England, in 1878, that “the primary 
cause of its [Britain’s] superiority over other parts of the world [is] 
the encroachment of the mind of man upon the organic and inorganic 
forces of nature.”65 Civilization and legal order were a triumph over 
both external nature and human nature; a conquest of both the 
primitive environment and the primitive human. Thus, conquest of 
nature became one of the foundational myths of modernity, tied to 
humanity’s spiritual freedom. Leading thinkers such as John Locke 
identified the absence of transformation of the natural environment as 
evidencing a lack of reason itself.66 Similarly, Karl Marx argued that 
“[m]an made himself and was himself only so far as he re-made the 
world around him.”67 
Imperial assumptions about what it means to be modern were not 
overturned upon postcolonial states gaining their independence, but in 
many ways consolidated. Postcolonial societies could only enjoy 
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independence through adopting the political form of the sovereign 
state, and sovereign statehood brought with it fundamental 
assumptions about nature that shaped governance and law. 
Postcolonial leaders frequently pursued economic paths of 
industrialization mapped out by Western ideas of development. As 
being modern, developed, and cultured was tied to efficient 
exploitation of the natural environment, most of the legal concepts 
and systems that allowed for this were either maintained from 
colonial times or new laws were instituted. 
It was in this context that, at the height of the Cold War, the G-77 
(or Non-Aligned Movement) asserted the doctrine of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources as part of its effort to break away 
from colonial patterns of resource exploitation. While Western 
knowledge and expertise were purchased to enable efficient 
exploitation of natural resources, postcolonial states remained wary of 
overdependence on the West.68 Although permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources was a revolutionary doctrine, and an integral part of 
the New International Economic Order, the idea was also used by 
Arab governing elites to consolidate their own power. Political 
authority and statecraft were intimately intertwined with keeping both 
natural resources, and the science and technology used to harness 
them, firmly under state control.69 The conquest of nature went hand 
in hand with the establishment of unitary and autocratic states.70 The 
Arab region’s natural wealth, especially with regard to the 
hydrocarbons that fuel much of world industry and trade, helped 
achieve many of the region’s development gains in recent decades.71 
However, it simultaneously built up and cemented power of 
unrepresentative governing elites. Sovereign and independent Arab 
governments were complicit in creating the inequity and ecological 
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decay that Arab communities find themselves in today, through the 
continuance of development and industrialization policies and laws 
that have been, at best, unimaginative, and, at worst, neocolonial. 
Thus, the Arab Spring oftentimes articulates its resistance in ways 
that echo anti-colonial independence struggles. 
The struggle for sovereignty over natural resources shaped the 
nature of Arab states and remains at the root of contemporary societal 
tensions. In Iraq, benefit-sharing from energy is the backdrop for 
unresolved disputes over constitutionalism, federalism, and regional 
autonomy.72 In Egypt, forty percent of the population lives under the 
national poverty line, largely because the rural and urban poor lack 
access to decision-making regarding natural resources on which their 
livelihoods depend, whether in fishing, farming, cotton, or the oil and 
gas industries.73 In Sudan, in the separation of North and South, the 
most contentious issues remain disputes over oil, water, and 
rangelands.74 Perhaps the most pressing issue facing the region is 
water shortage. In Yemen, the Arab region’s poorest state, water 
scarcity has reached emergency proportions and is the main 
bottleneck to equitable and sustainable development.75 In Syria, 
severe drought has pushed parts of the population to migrate.76 In 
Syria and Jordan, there are protests over equitable access to drinking 
water and irrigation.77 In Saudi Arabia, there are protests over 
 
72 Nathan J. Brown, The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and 
Commentary, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Sept. 16, 2005), 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/FinalDraftSept16.pdf; Christopher M. 
Blanchard, Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation, Revenue Sharing, and U.S. Policy, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Nov. 3, 2009). 
73 A Vision for Agriculture 2017, EGYPT NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 6 
(2005), http://www.undp.org.eg/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=hX%2BQrUZc%2B9g%3D 
&tabid=187&mid=675. 
74 See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, SUDAN: POST-CONFLICT 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (2007); Environment and Energy for Sustainable 
Development, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME SUDAN, http://www.sd 
.undp.org/focus_environment.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
75 REPUBLIC OF YEMEN: COUNTRY PROFILE, U.N. Development Programme, 
http://www.undp.org.ye/y-profile.php (last updated Mar. 17, 2012). 
76 Emergency Response to the Drought in the North-East of Syria, WORLD FOOD 
PROGRAMME, http://www.wfp.org/content/emergency-response-drought-north-east-syria 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2012) (describing the consequences of the third consecutive year of 
drought in Syria). 
77 See generally WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: COOPERATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
SOLUTIONS IN THE JORDAN VALLEY (K. David Hambright, F. Jamil Ragep & Joseph 
GINAT eds., 2005); Nicolas Pelham, Jordan’s Balancing Act, MIDDLE EAST REPORT 
ONLINE (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero022211. 
2012] TWAIL and the Environment: The State of Nature, 197 
the Nature of the State, and the Arab Spring 
flooding and environmental infrastructure.78 In the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, scarcity of clean water, lack of access to 
energy, increasing pollution, and the inability to control natural 
resource use were recently reflected in a draft declaration at the U.N. 
General Assembly on permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people 
over their natural resources.79 
In addition, there are the well-known cases of the oil economies of 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria. Ever since the 
discovery of its vast oil fields, access to this strategic resource has 
influenced states’ policies in the Arab region with regard to 
colonization, decolonization, military intervention, military and 
financial aid, foreign direct investment, sanctions, embargoes, and a 
myriad of other foreign policy issues. State responses to the Arab 
Spring are no different. The oil-driven dynamic is evidenced by 
selective international interventions in support of one or the other 
side, such as that by NATO to aid Libyan revolutionaries, by the Gulf 
Cooperation Council in support of the Bahrain monarchy, as well as 
increasing U.S. militarization of its allies and bases in the Persian 
Gulf including in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. As a result, experts as 
well as the general public have clearly different expectations from the 
Arab Spring in oil-importing states as opposed to oil-exporting states. 
Most confidently predict that attempts at revolution and 
democratization in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, or other oil rich 
Gulf states, will fail.80 Since the onset of the Arab Spring, 
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longstanding autocratic rulers in these states have alternated between 
fierce repression, and pacifying their populace with larger-than-usual 
cash payments, subsidies, and token reform efforts. 
For many of these nations, oil exports are the foundation of their 
social welfare and development gains. Their reserves are declining at 
a time of rapid population growth. Arab states are facing a youth 
population bulge and large levels of youth unemployment. As 
countries seek to boost employment through industrial growth, their 
energy intensity rises dramatically. In Saudi Arabia, currently about 
three out of ten million barrels per day are used in the local economy 
and the rest is exported. By 2030, this could rise to eight million 
barrels per day for local use.81 Thus, oil economies are seeking to 
reduce the energy intensity of their growth, as well as investing in 
renewable energy, so as to save scarce resources for security of future 
generations. 
Energy access and use in the Arab world is characterized by 
extreme inequality. Most countries in the region are net energy 
importers. With oil prices at record highs, and likely to increase, such 
states are continually increasing budget allocation for energy at the 
expense of other aspects of social welfare. While the per capita 
energy consumption in places such as the Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain is among the highest in the world,82 
more than forty percent of Arab populations in rural and urban poor 
areas do not have adequate access to energy services.83 Electrification 
rates in Arab countries in 2008 varied from as high as 100 percent in 
countries such as Kuwait, Lebanon, and Bahrain, to as low as twenty-
five to thirty percent in the Sudan.84 
Unemployment, combined with spiking food prices, were also 
important factors in spurring the 2011 Arab protests. The rise in food 
prices was partially attributable to climate impacts on global food 
production, with record droughts in Russia and flooding in Australia 
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in 2010.85 In the coming decades, North Africa is expected to see 
some of world’s worst impacts of climate change.86 In many Arab 
states, an unusually high proportion of household incomes is allocated 
to the purchase of food; for example more than thirty-five percent of 
household incomes in Tunisia and Egypt are allocated to food 
purchases.87 As U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon observed in 
2007, “when resources are scarce—whether energy, water or arable 
land—our fragile ecosystems become strained, as do the coping 
mechanisms of groups and individuals. This can lead to breakdown of 
codes of conduct.”88 
CONCLUSION 
The Arab world’s looming challenge is one of environmental and 
political sustainability. Its natural resources are dwindling at a time 
when its population is rapidly expanding. Environmental and natural 
resources issues must be prioritized in order to meet the Arab 
Spring’s demands for equity and justice. The region’s most poor and 
vulnerable depend on having a resilient natural asset base for their 
livelihoods. Given the onset of environmental crises, the capacity to 
adapt and cope with ecological change is also becoming increasingly 
important. While the rich receive a disproportionate benefit from the 
exploitation of natural resources, the poor bear a disproportionate 
burden of scarcity, pollution, and environmental crises. 
As the Arab region calls for a new era of more inclusive 
governance, communities look to the law, both international and 
domestic, as the means of remedying historical disempowerment. 
Protestors have called for an end to the thievery of public wealth by 
ruling elites, demanding punishment, transparency, accountability, 
and remedy. There is also a renewed spirit of constitutionalism—a 
review of fundamental principles in order to inaugurate new power 
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dynamics and place limits on state power. However, the law has in 
many ways been complicit in creating the inequity and ecological 
decay in the region. Indeed, the dominant international development 
paradigm and its indicators of progress declared many Arab states to 
be human development success stories, masking the dark underbelly 
of development processes now surfacing in mass movements across 
the region. To meet the rising demands for justice, the concept of 
sovereignty over natural resources must transcend nation-state 
paradigms and reside with Arab peoples in a meaningful way. 
Postcolonial states spared no effort in “leapfrogging across the 
centuries” to become industrial states.89 Today, ecological change 
presents an existential threat. Environmental crises such as climate 
change and biodiversity loss evidence the limits of Western 
understandings of the global economy and the unsustainability of 
economic models that do not take into consideration natural limits to 
growth. States and peoples in First and Third Worlds look over their 
shoulders at progress made and question evolutionary certainties and 
one-way determinism. As Amartya Sen observed, the solutions to 
problems of global public goods such as the natural environment “will 
almost certainly call for institutions that take us beyond the capitalist 
market economy.”90 
Young international lawyers in the Arab world are increasingly 
drawn to Third World and postcolonial approaches to international 
law not only because mainstream international law discourse fails to 
explain their lived experience, but also because they are searching for 
more strategic and productive ways of engaging with the international 
sphere. Past efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to strengthen the 
sovereignty of Third World states led only to a profound lack of 
sovereignty for most Arab peoples. Doctrines such as permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources are yet to be realized in a 
meaningful way in a region where most have little say in what is done 
with either wealth-creating resources such as oil and mineral wealth, 
or dwindling essentials such as water and arable land. Lasting 
solutions to the demands of the Arab Spring will need to address not 
only civil and political rights, but also rethink fundamental 
assumptions about what it means to be a state. Central to this process 
is addressing the role of the natural environment in postcolonial state 
formation, and how the ability to control nature became an assumed 
attribute of both sovereignty and development. We need to address 
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the underlying features of our political economy by rethinking our 
Enlightenment inheritance, and whether the assertion of control is any 
longer a meaningful, helpful, or indeed accurate understanding of 
humanity’s relationship with nature. 
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